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Abstract
Nonlinear cost functions are employed to study the effects of scale
and client media allocations on advertising agency costs. Over 200 UoS
agencies in 1977 were apparently large enough to exhaust essentially all
economies of scale, though very small agencies may have had substantial
scale-related cost disadvantages. Agencies' costs seem to be sensitive to the
mix of media in which their clients advertise. On average, larger agencies'
clients advertise in media that are apparently more profitable for the
agencies. Implications for a number of issues in marketing and industrial
organization are briefly explored.
We want to do the best work
possible for our clients, make sure
our people are well-paid, and see our
stockholders make money. None of
that has anything to do with size.
John V. Kinsella, Leo Burnett Co.
(Business Week, 1981, p. 196.)
I. INTRODUCTION
This study attempts to answer a simple question: how important are
economies of scale in advertising agency operations? Advertising agencies,
like most other businesses, are multiple-product firms. An agency's costs
may depend on how their clients allocate their advertising budgets across
media and there is considerable variation in media mix among agencies. (Sec-
tionII provides some quantitative information on this variation.) Accordingly,
we use nonlinear estimation techniques to examine the influences of both scale
and media mix on advertising agency costs. We find evidence that scale
economies may not be as important as many have argued and that media mix is.
a significant determinant of costs. Differences in media mix between large
and small agencies seem typically to lower the costs of the former
relative to the latter even if all economies of scale have been exhausted.
The question of scale economies underlies a number of current and long-
standing controversies related to advertising agency operations. First, the
ability to exploit economies of scale is often given as a rationale for agency
mergers. However, much skepticism has also been expressed about the reali-
zation of such an advantage through mergers and acquisitions (Kanner 1979)
and the Federal Trade Commission reportedly did not view several mergers
involving large agencies as serious threats to competition (Gordon 1979).
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Secondly, the issue of economies of scale underlies the problem of designing an
equitable agency compensation scheme (Calantone and Drury 1979, Gross 1972).
Both agencies and clients have voiced dissatsifaction with the traditional
agency compensation arrangement, wherein the agency's fee is a fixed percentage,
typically 15 percent, of the client's gross spending on advertising media
(Booz, Allen & Hamilton 1965, Frey and Davis 1958). This dissatisfaction is
usually based on the perception of economies of scale at least with respect
to account size: agencies complain that they are underpaid by small accounts,
and clients are suspicious of being overcharged for large campaigns. Still,
the most recent study bearing on this issue conducted by the Association of
National Advertisers (1979) found that the commission system continues to be the
dominant method of compensation with 57 percent of the 236 advertisers surveyed
reporting they utilized media commissions plus markups-on production costs,' while.
another 18 percent employed a combination of commissions and fees. Finally,
evidence on scale economies might contribute to a satisfactory explanation of
the limited incidence of "in-house" as opposed to "independent" agencies.2
Advertising agency cost structures are also of interest to specialists in
industrial organization. The importance of scale economies in advertising
3
generally has been much debated in the literature. Any such economies must
reflect both the nature of consumer response to advertising messages and
the cost of delivering those messages. Advertising agency fees are a part
of this cost from the advertiser's point of view, while the agency's costs
represent part of the social cost involved. Even ignoring the advertising
debate, advertising agencies are highly visible multiple-product firms
engaged in what sometimes appears to be intense competition. The implica-
tions of cost conditions for the nature of market interaction in such a
setting merits study in its own right.
III
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Despite the relevance of information on advertising agency cost-
structures to a broad range of important questions, there are no published
econometric studies of the effects of scale and media mix on agency costs.
Section II discusses the data we employ to study those effects, and Section III
presents the cost function specifications we estimate. Section IV describes
our empirical results which are further discussed in Section V. Section VI
summarizes the conclusions and implications we draw from them.
II. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA BASE DESCRIPTION
The variables and measures used in the analysis reported below are
defined as follows:
Y = Agency gross income from U.S. operations (millions of dollars
in 1977),
E Agency employment in U.S. operations (number of employees in
1977),
U = E/Y or number of employees per million dollars of gross income
in 1977,
S = Share of an agency's billings derived from medium j, j=l,...,10
Yj = SJY Estimated gross income from medium j.
The unit of analysis throughout is an individual agency.
Gross Income (Y). An agency's gross income represents its "sales
receipts minus cost of goods sold" and is the sum of revenues obtained
from three sources: (1) commissions earned from purchases of media time
and space made on behalf of clients; (2) markups on materials and services
purchased from "outside" suppliers and charged to clients; and (3) fees
paid by clients for agency services as an addition to or in lieu of com-
missions and markups. Gross income is generally accepted in the advertising
____1 __11______1________ __
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industry as the preferred measure of agency size or output since it is
better suited to comparative analyses than other aggregate indicators such as
billings or capitalized billings. These may give a misleading picture of out-
put due to variations in media mix and compensation arrangements (O'Gara
1978, Paster 1981). Historically, media commissions have accounted for
the bulk of agencies' gross income. Data from the 1967 Census of Business
(Table 4, p 8.22) indicate that for 1,380 advertising agencies with annual
payrolls of $50,000 or more, 83.6 percent of their gross income came from
commissions on media billings. For the industry as a whole, the ratio of media
commissions to media billings appeared to be just under 15 percent.
These 1967 Census results also show that reliance on media commissions
as a source of gross income tends to be related to agency size - the relevant
percentage increasing from 66.6 for agencies with receipts of less than $1 million.
to 88.6 for those with receipts of $25 million or more. Summary data from
the American Association of. Advertising Agencies' (1975, p. 22) studies of
its membership show a similar relationship.
Number of mployees per Million Dollars of Gross Income (U). We employ
this ratio as a proxy for an agency's average cost. Published summaries of
cost data collected annually by the American Association of Advertising Agen-
cies from approximately 250 of its member agencies show that payroll and
related employee benefits (insurance and retirement) average about 65 percent
of agency gross income or about 70 percent of total expenses (Marshall 1981).
The latter percentage has remained stable over time (Marshall 1981) and appears
to vary little with agency size cross-sectionally (Edwards 1973). However,
there is only sparce evidence to be found in published.sources on the cross-
sectional variation in payroll expense.5 Thus while the ratio of employees
to gross income is clearly not an ideal measure of unit cost, it is the best
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6proxy available to us. We have no reason to suspect that its use will intro-
duce substantial bias here.7
Share of Billings by Media Category (S.) Agencies generally create, pro-
duce, and place advertising in several different media, and variations in the
media mix their clients employ are a likely source of inter-agency cost dif-
ferentials. As an indication of the composition of an agency's output, we
use the share of its total billings to clients associated with each of the
ten categories listed below in Table 1. An agencyt s total billings to its
clients consists of charges for media time and space, for other materials and
services purchased from outside suppliers, and for services performed within
the agency, inclusive of all commissions, markups, and fees. The "Other"
category in Table 1 thus covers a diverse.set of non-media-related activities:
its composition varies from agency to agency according to the nature of special-
ized services each performs. Examples of services typically included in the
"Other" category are public relations, new product development, sales promo-
tion, and marketing research.
In the analysis that follows, we treat the shares of an agency's billings
in each media category as unbiased measures of the shares of its gross income
attributable to those media. (In other contexts, this would correspond roughly
to treating shares of "sales" as measures of shares of "sales minus costs of
goods sold".) This is strictly valid only if the ratio of gross income to
billings is constant for all media within each agency. Unfortunately, the
information required to check this condition directly is not available in our
data base, and we have been unable to find other relevant evidence in any
published sources. Industry sources do indicate that the commission rate
allowed agencies on space and time purchases varies little by medium, the
standard being 15 percent. However, two other pieces of evidence combine to
suggest that the ratio of gross income to billings for. at least some media
may vary systematically with agency size. First, the importance of media
_- _ _ __ __ _ _1^ 1-^-.- lI.. ·__ .,., --------- ---- _1 ~ _~ ..~...~~ 
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commissions as a source of gross income tends to increase as agency gross
income increases In addition to the 1967 Census results noted above, the
American Association of Advertising Agencies, which regularly surveys its
membership on their compensation practices, reports that the ratio of gross
income to billings decreases from 30 percent in the "smallest" agencies to
15 percent in the "largest agencies" (Paster, 1981). Second, as is discussed
below, we find evidence of weak cross-sectional relationships between media
share of billings and agency gross income for three of the ten media categories
studied. These two bits of evidence suggest that some systematic errors may
arise from using a medium's share of billings as a proxy for that medium's
share of gross income, but they do not permit us to assess the likely impor-
tance of such errors.. We return to this problem in the discussion of our
statistical results and their implications below.
Estimated Gross Income by Media Category. Y.) These quantities were
obtained by multiplying the share of an agency's billings in each medium (Sj)
by its total gross income (Y)o They are used in one of our two basic speci-
fications as proxy measures of the scale of agency operations or output in
each medium The discussion above of possible measurement problems with the
Sj clearly also applies here.
In all of our cost function analysis, gross income (Y), media shares (the
Sj), and media incomes (the Yj) are treated as exogenous. Agencies may, of
course, affect all these variables, but as long as employment levels are
freely variable in response to changes in agency size and media mix, no statis-
tical problems result. And advertising agencies are well-known to make sub-
stantial staffing changes quickly in response to gains and losses of business.
The source of the above data used here was the 1978 edition of Advertising
Age's annual compilation of operating results for individual agencies.8 Know-
ledgeable industry personnel who have spot checked portions of these data from
III
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time to time indicate they are reliable. For 1977, data were reported for 583
9
agencies, listed in order of their billing size. This list was sampled sys-
tematically by choosing a starting point randomly and then selecting every
sixth agency appearing thereafter. In a few cases, data missing from Adver-
tising Age's reports were obtained from the June 1978 edition of the Standard
Directory of Advertising Agencies. This procedure resulted in a sample of 91
agencies for which the required information on gross income, number of employees,
and share of total billings by media was available with reference to their
U.S. operations in 1977.
The mean 1977 U.S. gross income in our final sample of 91 agencies is $4.90
million, with a standard deviation of $14.12 million. (Using the standard
15 percent commission rate, the sample mean gross income corresponds to total
billings of about $32.7 million.) The distribution of agency gross incomes (Y)
is clearly highly skewed; the range is from $48 thousand to $92.8 million. In
terms of total U.S. billings, the range is from $440 thousand to $619 million.
The mean number of employees (E) is 112.57, the standard deviation is
311.5, and the range is from 2 to 2190. The distribution of employees per
million dollars of gross income (U) is much less skewed: the mean is 30.67,
the standard deviation is 12.60, and the range is from 9.26 to 84.51.
Information on the S, the 1977 media shares, is provided in Table 1.
The second and third columns give some indication of the relative impor-
tance of the different media to the agencies in our sample. Note that
the first four media account for 70 percent of the gross income of an
average agency (column 2) and 85 percent of the aggregate gross income in
our sample (column 3)0 The difference between these two figures indicates
that there is a tendency for these four.media to be more important, on
average, for larger than for smaller agencies. The first four media listed
in Table 1 (and in all subsequent tables) are referred to as major media
in what follows; the others are labeled minor media.
-- ·-·---- ··`"^ ' ~~" ~ ~ ._ .~~-`~~~ I~--~"~~~'---- --- - ----. l-I- --~-~~~~~~
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InsertsTable 1 Here
In order to explore variations in media mix with size, we regress share
for each media category (S.) on the natural logarithm of gross income (Y)e
The slope coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics are given in the
fourth column of Table 1. On average, the larger an agency, the larger the share
of revenue received from television advertising, and the smaller the share of
newspaper and radio advertising, with declines in the relative importance
of direct mail and farm publications also likely. None of these regressions
has an R above 0.12. There is thus considerable variation in media mix
that is unrelated to agency size.
The last two columns in Table 1 give some feel for the extent of vari-
ation in media shares. While nine agencies report no billings from
magazine advertising, for instance, one agency reports no billings from
any other source! Note in particular the large numbers of agencies reporting no
billings from the less important media. Without aggregation over these
media, this limits the precision with which we can expect to estimate
coefficients that relate to them. However, we have no a priori
information that permits us to aggregate with any confidence. Indeed, since,
for example, spot and network television differ in certain respects (Porter,
1976), we would elect to disaggregate further if it were possible to do so.
Our use of cross-section data to estimate a long-run cost function requires
some discussion. Because advertising agencies employ relatively little firm-
specific capital and their employment levels are notoriously flexible,
deviations from long-run equilibrium in any single year should be relatively
minor. Thus Friedman's (1955) classic critique' of this approach has relatively
little force in this case. Since price competition is apparently relatively
III
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unimportant in this industry, it seems sensible to model agencies as minimizing
the cost of meeting the exogenoutsly-determined demand for their services.
Given product differentiation and the importance of regional markets, at
least for some agencies, a cross-section sample such as ours can be expected
to contain a range of equilibrium firm sizes and media mixes. Finally, it
should be noted that with no available data on input and output prices, there is
no obvious way to use the profit-maximization or cost-minimization assumption
to improve. estimation efficiency.
III. COST FUNCTION SPECIFICATION
Suppose, for the moment, that we are dealing with a single-product
industry and are concerned with estimation of the importance of scale
economies. A reasonable specification would then be the following:
.U = + Se Y, (1)
where U is a measure of average cost (as here), Z is a scale-related vari-
able, and t, 6, and y are positive constants. This function is illustrated
in Figure 1. Its shape is broadly consistent with the empirical literature
on economies of scale in many industries. 2 A quadratic specification
would also involve only three parameters, but if it implied declining
average costs at small scale, it would also imply either that U is negative
at very large scales or that U is increasing after some point, and neither
13
implication is plausible. If U were a log-linear function of Z and scale
economies were estimated, it would follow that U approached zero for large Z,
which is also implausible.1 4 Thus, even though equation (1) requires non-
linear estimation, it seems more sensible than the obvious alternatives.
Insert Figure 1 Here
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Equation (1) implies that U is an everywhere decreasing function of Z,
so there is no finite Z at which scale economies are completely exhausted.
Once U is near its asymptotic value, a, however, further increases in scale
are of no quantitative importance. We can thus say that scale economies are
essentially exhausted for a firm of size Z* if U(Z*) (+g) , where is a
small number. Solving for Z*, we obtain an indicator of minimum efficient
scale:
Z* = -(l/y)ln(ae/8). (2)
In what follows we us e 0.01, so that a scale of Z* corresponds to
costs one percent above the asymptotic minimum. Another measure of the
importance of scale economies is the cost penalty incurred by firms operating
at inefficiently small scales. If a firm's scale is kZ*, where 0 < k < 1,
its cost disadvantage relative to a firm of scale Z* is given by
D* = [U(kZ*)-U(Z*)]/U(Z*) = E (/a)-k /[l.] (3)
In what follows, we set k = 1/2 in order to permit comparability with
similar estimates for other industries? 5 The determination of Z* and D*
is illustrated in Figure .
Now suppose a firm produces N products and that equation (1), with
j subscripts everywhere, refers to the unit cost of the jth product. Mul-
tiplying by Sj and summing, we obtain our basic equation for long-run
average cost:
N N
.U £ ac S + 8Si exp(-yjZj. (4)
Depending on the details of the technology involved, the Z might be
complex functions of all output levels.
III
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Since we had 10 "products" (media) here and only 91 observations, we
could not hope to obtain unrestricted estimates of the cost complementarities
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or economies of scope that might be present. Instead, we investigated
two relatively simple polar case specifications of the way an agency's output
levels interact to determine its average cost. We did not begin with a prior
assumption that one or the other must be the true specification. Rather,
our view was that these specifications bracket the truth. If the specifi-
cation tests described in Section IV below were to reject one of them, the
other might sensibly be treated as a good approximation to the true specifi-
cation. If not, our assumption was that they bracket the truth in such a
way that qualitative statements supported by both are likely to be correct.
The first polar case assumes essentially that scale economies arise
in those agency activities, like client contact and concept development,
that are essentially independent of media mix allocations. Under that
assumption, the most plausible scale variable for all products" is the
overall size of the agency, measured here by gross income, Y. Considering
natural restrictions on the parameters in (4), we obtain a set of five
partially nested models:
l.· Ui = a + exp(-yYi) + ui
10
I.2 Ui ='c S + exp(-yYi) + ui
J=l j S i j
10 10
1.3 Ui =[ SI + [ -jSijexP(-YYi) + u.
1.4 U, =! a S + 01 Sexp (-y Y1
.jl- j=l j
10 10U1.5 a4 + sY) U
1.5 Ui a j S4 + jSijexp(YYi + u iJ1z J -~ j 3 J
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Here i is an agency subscript, and the ui are assumed to be normal disturbance
terms with all the usual desirable properties. Models 1.1 5 are referred
to collectively as Model I in what follows,
The polar opposite specification assumes no economies of scope. That is,
it assumes no interaction among the agencies' outputs in determining unit
cost, If all activities are independent, the natural scale variable for
activity j is Y., estimated gross income from the corresponding medium.
Recall that the Y are only estimates since the S refer to billings, not
gross income. Using the same notation as above, the models that together
are identified as Model II are the following:
10
II.1 U. = + S i j exp(-Yij) + u
10 10
1,12 Ui = _ a.Sij + Sexp(-yY.) + u i
J=l j= 3 3
inl 10
IZIe 4 U a I S + 3 . iexp(Yj) + u i
.3 U j= j ij=l s i
10 10
1I.4 U = ca.S + B S.. exp(yj.Yi + u.
J=1 j j=1 13 3
10 10
II.5 U = lajS + IASij exp(-YjYi) + u
In both Models, one can go from the parameter estimates to a long-run
average cost equation of the form of (1) for each medium. The 's from
all specifications can thus be interpreted (proVided estimated parameters
have expected signs) as the large-scale limiting values of medium-specific
Ill
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unit cost. Similarly, the D*'s computed from the various specifications
are in the same units. In Model I, however, the Z* statistics give the
minimum agency size (Y) necessary for each product to be produced at nearly
minimum cost, while the Z* computed from Model II estimates give the minimum
medium incomes (Yj) necessary for the corresponding products to be produced
efficiently.
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The nonlinear least-squares routine in the TROLL system at MIT was
employed to obtain parameter estimates for these 10 long-run average cost
functions. Experimentation with starting values for models Io3, 1.4, II.3,
and II.4 revealed the existence of multiple local minima of the sums of
.. o
squared residuals. The corresponding parameter values were often markedly
different, though the sums of squared residuals were generally not. Because
of what seems to be a close analog of the multicollinearity problem in ordinary
least squares, we thus cannot be absolutely certain that we have found the
global minimum sums of squared residuals for these models° This same problem
was even more severe for models 1.5 and 11.5, and considerable experimentation
was required to obtain even one well-behaved local minimum for each. The
program was unable even to compute an estimated covariance matrix for model
1.5. We suspect that at least one reason for these computational difficulties
was the large number of zero values for the S in this sample. (See Table 1.)
We employed F-tests within Models I and II to select specifications for
17
further study. The results of thoses tests are shown in Figure 2o The
2
R statistics for each model are shown.in parentheses, arrows point from
the restricted model to the unrestricted model used in each test, and the
numbers beside each. arrow given the significance level (expressed as a per-
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centage) at which the null hypothesis of the validity of the restrictions
involved was rejected. In parentheses next to each arrow is shown the coef-
ficient or coefficients whose equality across media is tested. In both 1Models,
the hypothesis of equal O's is decisively rejected; different media clearly
have different cost implications. Similarly, the comparisons of models .2 and
II.2 with less restrictive alternatives indicates that there is no justifi-
cation for assuming B = and y y for all j. Once either one of these is
relaxed, however, little extra explanatory power is gained by relaxing the
other. In view of the numerical problems noted above, it thus seemed sensible
not to use the fully unrestricted specifications, models 1.5 and II.5, but
rather to focus on models I.3, 1.4, II.3, and II4.
Insert Figure 2 Here
Comparisons of these four specifications do not'provide adequate
grounds for dropping any of them. They have essentially equivalent
explanatory power, as the R statistics in Figure 2 indicate. All except
1.4, which has the lowest R , produce a number of coefficient estimates
with signs contrary to our expectation. (Available estimation routines did
not permit us to impose non-negativity constraints on the coefficients.)
These estimates and their interpretation are discussed below. Observations
are ordered by gross income (Y), so that low values of the Durbin-Watson
statistic might serve to signal misspecification. . But all four of these
statistics are above 1.93, and all except that for model II.4 are above 1.98.
Insert Figure 3 Here
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A comparison of R s suggests that it may be more appropriate to
restrict the y's (models Io3 and I1.3) than to restrict the i's (models
1.4 and II.4), though the differences are slight. Similarly, differences
in the explanatory power of the assumptions that scale effects relate to
agency size (Model I) and that they relate to media-specific income
(Model II) are slight. In an attempt to shed more light on these issues,
we used the P-test for specification recently proposed by Davidson and
MacKinnon (1981). 18 In this test, one rejects the null hypothesis that any
particular model is correctly specified if the fitted values from any other model
significantly enhance its explanatory power. Results are shown in Figure 3:
arrows point away from models being tested and toward the models used to generate
fitted values, and the numbers next to arrows give the significance levels
(expressed as percentages) at which the null hypothesis of correct specification is
rejected. 9 All specifications except model 1.4, which has the least
explanatory power, are rejected at least once at conventional significance
levels. This is at least consistent with our prior belief that none of
these are likely to be the correct model,.but the pattern of results does
not seem to provide much additional information.
In short, the data do not permit us to drop either Model I or Model II
as distinctly inferior to the other. We are thus unable to say anything
about the appropriate scale variable or, more generally, about the way out-
puts interact to determine cost. Accordingly, we concentrate on inferences
consistent with all four sets of estimates.
Table 2 presents the estimates of the aj from all four models, along with
standard errors and precision-weighted means for summary purposes2 0 Only
four of these estimates, all produced by model II.4 for minor media are nega-
tive. Aside from those estimates, all of which have-very large standard
errors, there is considerable agreement among alternative specifications as
__ __. I_______ll____aj(_____/l·Ill-iiL
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to the pattern of differences among media. The substantial difference between
the limiting costs associated with newspapers and television is of particular
interest and is discussed further below. The differences among the minor
media (compare business and farm publications in particular) would seem to
confirm our fear that aggregation might be misleading.
Insert Table 2 Near Here
Inspection of the estimated B's and ys from our four specifications
does not provide much information about the importance of scale economies.
Accordingly, we present instead estimates of the Z* and D* statistics
21developed in Section 3, along'with their asymptotic standard errors.21
Table 3 gives the estimates of Z*, minimum efficient agency gross
income, from Model I. As before, we summarize with precision-weighted
means. In order to permit comparisons with the results from Model II,
these means are translated into media incomes using the mean shares given
in Table 1. The corresponding estimates from Model II, in which Y replaces
3
Y as the scale variable for medium j, are given in Table 4.
Insert Tables 3 & 4 Near Here
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All specifications indicate that scale economies in the four major media
are essentially exhausted by agencies with gross incomes of less than a
million dollars. (A gross income of $1 million corresponds to total billings
of about $6.7 million.) Advertising Ag e (1978) reports that 240 agencies
had gross incomes above a million dollars in 1977 and thus had very likely
exhausted all scale economies associated with the four most important media.
Because of the tendency of large agencies to have disproportionately more
television-related income than small agencies, one might expect television
-17-
to show especially important economies of scale. But the results in Tables 3
and 4 are not consistent with this expectation.n The Z*'s for television,
general magazines, and newspapers cannot be confidently ordered on the
basis of our results. It appears that any scale economies associated with
radio are exhausted at very small output levels, and there is reason to
doubt (see models 1.3 and II.3) that any such economies exist.
The Model I estimates in Table 3 show exhaustion of scale economies at
small agency size for the minor media as well as for the major media. The
minor-media statistics from Model II, which are much less reliable because
of the large number of incorrectly-signed estimates, are somewhat more sug-
gestive of the possibility of non-trivial economies of scale. Such
economies would be consistent, at least, with. the large number of agencies
receiving no income at all from each of the minor media. (See Table 1.)
But this same fact makes these estimates particularly unreliable. In any
case, only one Model II estimate in Table 4 implies that an agency would
need to have much over a million dollars in gross income, on average, in
order to exhaust all economies of scale. The results in Tables 3 and 4
do not permit one to compare Z*'s among the minor media with any confidence.
Even though economies of scale appear to be relatively unimportant in
the sense that many (over 200) U.S. advertising agencies are apparently
large enough to have exhausted them, it does not follow that very small
agencies do not operate under significant scale-related cost disadvantages.
Table 5 presents estimates of D*, the cost penalty borne as a consequence
of operating at one-half minimum efficient scale (Z*), for each medium
from our four models.2 3 On the whole, these estimated penalties are sub-
stantial in absolute terms and large relative to similar estimates in the
literature for other industries.2 4 Among the major media, it appears that
penalties for operation at very small scale are more important for televi-
-18-
sion and general magazines than for newspapers and radio. (Again, there are
reasons to doubt the existence of any scale economies for radio.) The results
for the minor media do not seem to permit any statements about relative values
of D* to be made with much confidence.
Because the S are imperfect measures of gross income shares, and the j
reflect those imperfections, theestimated differences amongmedia shown in
Tables 2 - 5 must be interpreted with caution, If, for some medium, the
ratio of S to the corresponding share of gross income is negatively correlated
with agency size, the increase in Y with agency size will be understated,
and scale economies will tend to be underestimated as well.25 If this happens
for some media, however, t follows that scale economies associated with other
media will be understated on average. Since we find that scale economies for
all media are essentially exhausted at gross incomes of around a million dol-
lars, systematic errors in the S are unlikely to have biased our overall
ci~ ~ ~~2
conclusions regarding minimum efficient agency sizes.2 6 Similarly, one must
treat differences in the D* estimates in Table 5 with caution, but the general
pattern of substantial cost penalties for small-scale operation is unlikley to
be affected by measurement problems with the S.
V
Insert Table 5 Here
V. DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that larger agencies derive larger shares of
their billings from media with lower unit costs. The media mix effect on
total costs is apparently quantitatively important. Neglecting any scale
effects, we can use the regression coefficients given in Tabe 1 along with
the precision-weighted et's from Table 2 to examine the impact of size-related
shifts in client media mix on agency costs. We find that an agency that
increases its gross incone by one standard deviation over the sample mean
-19-
(from Y = 4.90 to Y = 19.02) can expect a fall of 200 in Uo This is about
6.7% of. the sample mean of that variable and thus appears likley to have a
substantial effect on agency profits.
Our medium-specific cost function estimates do not suggest a satisfac-
tory explanation of scale-related changes in media billing shares. The con-
putations described in the preceeding paragraph are dominated by the effects
of a general rise in the share of television and a general fall in the share
of newspapers as agency size increases, But we do not find scale economies
in television to be more important than those associated with newspaper adver-
tising, so it is not clear that large agencies do more television because they
have a comparative cost advantage in that medium.
A tentative explanation of these scale-related differences in media mix
and unit cost is suggested by Porter's (1976) discussion of differences
among media. Briefly, Porter argues that the size of the "effective threshold,"
the minimum level of advertising expenditure required, varies by medium because
of differences in their "divisibility" with respect to the size and charac-
teristics of the audiences they reach. National media, such as network tele-
vision, are highly indivisible and thus useable mainly by large, national
advertisers. At the other extreme, newspapers are highly divisible because
their audiences are confined to small geographic areas, and their correspond-
ingly low effective thresholds make them attractive to small advertisers.
Other media fall somewhere between these extremes, If larger advertisers use
less divisible media, agency media mixes should reflect the sizes of their
clients' advertising budgets.
To pursue these ideas, we obtained a count of the number of accounts
served by 87 f the 91 agencies in our sample.27 Regressing the logarithm
of agency gross income (Y) on the logarithm of the number of accounts per
agency (A), we obtained the following results:
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ln(Y) -3.620 + 1.179 ln(A) + c R = o510
(.125) SE = 1.125
Based on the standard error of the slope coefficient (shown in parentheses),
we can reject the hypothesis that that coefficient equals unity at the 10%
level on a one-tailed test. This indicates that.larger agencies tend to have
larger accounts than smaller agencies, not just more accountso (Number of
accounts per agency in our sample varied from 2 to 339 with a mean of 34.17,
while gross income per account varied from $4,000 to $418,000 with a mean of
$86,520.)
Table 6 shows the results of regressing each of the S on the logarithm
of gross income per account (Y/A) for each agencye For only two media, tele-
vision and general magazines, do we find that increases in mean account size
are associated with increases in the corresponding share of billings, and the
coefficient for general magazines is insignificant. For the remaining six
categories, for which billings share was negatively related to mean account
size, three of the corresponding coefficients (those for newspapers, radio,
and business publications) are significant at the 10% level or beyond. These
patterns seem quite consistent with Porter's arguments about effective thresh-
olds and divisibility.
Insert Table 6 Here
These results suggest that size-related differences in agencies' media
mixes may be determined more by size-related differences in client charac-
teristics than by any advantage arising from economies of scale. Larger
agencies tend to serve advertisers who compete in large geographically exten-
sive markets and who accordingly make heavy use of national media such as
III
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network television and general magazines. In contrast, small agencies pri-
marily serve firms that operate in markets of more limited scope and that
efficiently spend their smaller budgets in local or specialized media such
as newspapers, radio, and business publications. One would expect agencies
considered to be especially effective, for reasons unrelated to scale econo-
mies, to attract large clients and thus grow large themselves. Large clients
should be willing to pay a premium to deal with such agencies, and those
premia may show up here as scale-related unit cost declines generated by media
mix effects° Another important factor at work here is the industry norm of.
an agency not serving competing accounts -- i.e., products/services that
compete directly with one another. We hasten to add that our evidence for
the above explanation is less than conclusive. Better tests might be obtained
if we could distinguish between network and spot shares for radio and tele-
vision and between national and regional shares for magazines.
.VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
To our knowledge, this is the first econometric study of advertising
agency cost functions. Clearly, there is more useful work to be done here.
Data limitations constrained our choice of specifications and made it impos-
sible for us to reach any conclusions on a number of questions. In particular,
we were not able to learn anything about the way in which agencies' media mixes
(or levels of output of advertising in the various media) interact with overall
scale to determine unit costs, and our results on medium-specific scale
effects must be treated with caution. Our two extreme models seem roughly
equally consistent with the data. We encountered multicollinearity-like
computational problems and obtained generally imprecise paramater estimates
for the minor media. Availability of data from the American Association of
Advertising Agencies' annual studies would likely permit some of these prob-
28lems to be overccone.
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On the other hand, our empirical analysis does suggest a number of con-
clusions with interesting implications for marketing and economics. First,
economies of scale are exhausted at output levels small relative to many
existing agencies. In particular, over 200 U.S. agencies were large enough
Ain 1977 to have realized essentially all scale-related efficiencies.2 9
Second, very small agencies '(with gross incomes under, say $0.5 million in
1977) may have substantial scale-related cost disadvantages relative to
larger agencies. Third, agencies' costs appear to be sensitive to the mix
of media in which their clients advertise. While measurement problems asso-
ciated with the S and the Y call for caution here, the highly significant
test results shown in Figure 2 for both our polar-case Models argue strongly
for the presence of media mix effects. Moreover, the asymptotic unit cost
estimates in Table 2 do not differ noticeably among alternative specifications
that should be affected differently by the media share measurement problem,
and they are generally consistent with the impressions of industry observers.
Finally, larger agencies tend to derive larger shares of their billings from
media with lower unit costs than do smaller agencies. Further examination
of this matter led us to suggest that size-related differences in agencies'
media mixes are more a reflection of size-related differences in clientele
served than a consequence of any cost advantage arising from economies of
scale.
These conclusions have implications for a number of the controversies
discussed in the introduction. First, our results suggest that, contrary
to a good deal of discussion in the trade press, mergers among the top 200
or so U.S. agencies are unlikely to yield efficiency gains based on scale
economies. Second, if all scale economies were account-specific, our esti-
mates suggest that up to billings of around $6.7 million in 1977 dollars,
large accounts would be cheaper to handle than small accounts on average,
III
-23-
Our data do not permit us to say anything about the plausibility of this
conjecture. Third, economies of scale do not seem sufficient to explain
the low incidence of "in-house" advertising agencies. Model I implies
that firms spending more than $7 million on advertising (in 977 dollars)
should be able to operate fuily-efficient in-house agencies, though firms
with substantially smaller budgets would have substantially higher costs.
Model II implies that even firms with budgets well below $7 million con-
centrated in a few media can fully exploit available scale economies.
Fourth, scale economies in advertising agencies do not seem sufficiently
important to be a major source of economically significant scale economies
in advertising generally. Finally, the analysis of Section v provides some
clues about the nature of competitive interactions among agencies, though
the picture that emerges there must be regarded more as an attractive
hypothesis than as a definite conclusion.
k _____
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Footnotes
1, Bojanek (1980) presents a history of agency merger activity and an
analysis of publicly-stated rationales for agency mergers. See
also Berstein (1979) and Zeltner (1979) 
2. Sethi (1975) provides background and analysis.
3. For a survey, see Comanor and Wilson (1979).
4. Findings from a study f profit and employees in relation to gross
income revenue for agencies of various sizes conducted by Rubel and
Humphrey, Inc. are summarized in Advertising Age (1979). The results
presented there suggest that scale economies may not be exhausted by
agencies with 6 million dollars in gross income in 1978. (Using the
standard 15% compensation formula, this corresponds to total billings of
about 40 million dollars.) However, no allowance is made for
media mix effects, nor are tests of significance presented or any break-
down of agencies with gross incomes above 6 million dollars given.
5. Advertising Age (1981) presents some summary tabulations from a survey
of agency salaries carried out be Rubel and Humphrey in 1978. Those
results (p. 99) show a tendency for average salary per employee to in-
crease with agency size. Informed industry sources indicate that this
is largely. a reflection of the tendency of large agencies to be located
in large, high-wage metropolitan areas. It does suggest, though, that
we may over-estimate the importance of scale economies by taking number
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of employees as a proxy for cost. 'It is also worth noting, however,
that reported salary expenses for incorporated agencies may be signifi-
cantly increased because firms seek to avoid double-taxation of dividends.
6. It bears noting that detailed data on the structure of agency income
and costs do exist from separate cross sectional surveys of agencies
conducted annually by the American Association of Advertising Agencies and
tr-annually by Rubel and Humphrey. Although highly aggregated smaries
appear regularly in Advertising Age (e.g. 1979, Marshall 1981), both
studies are proprietary. Despite several efforts, we have been unable to
gain access to these data. Hopefully, at some future time, these organi-
zations will see fit to make their unique data available for statistical
analyses.
7. In particular, conversations with industry participants do not suggest
a tendency for cost/employee to vary systematically with media mix.
8. We are indebted to Crain Communications, Inc. for permission to use these
copyrighted data which appeared in the March 13, 1978 issue of Advertising Age.
9. Details pertaining to how these agencies were selected are not reported.
Mention is made of the fact that "more than 125 agencies" returned ques-
tionnaires that were incomplete and therefore were excluded from the
listing (O'Gara 1978, p. 38).
10. Data from the 1977 Census of Business reported in Advertising Age indicates
that 5,973 agencies were operating in 75 standard metropolitan areas, and
employed a total of 70,043 persons or an average of 11.73 employees per agency.
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11. We also regressed media share (S.) on gross income (Y) itself, but the
semi-log specification generally had more explanatory power.
12. For a survey, see Scherer (1980, ch. 4),
13. That is, suppose U = a + bZ + cZ2 If average cost is declining with Z
for Z near zero, b must be negative. But then U must be negative for
large Z if c is non-positive or there must be diseconomies at large scales
if c is positive. The empirical work surveyed in Scherer (1980, ch 4)
suggest that such diseconomies are rare indeed.
14. Bojanek (1980) reports some generally unsatisfactory experiments with this
specification.
15. See, for example, Scherer (1980), pp. 96-7.
16. For the sorts of specifications that might be employed to obtain such
estimates, see, for instance, Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1980)
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982, ch. 4) provide a useful discussion of
economies of scope and other multi-product cost concepts.
17. Because estimation is nonlinear, hypothesis tests have only asymptotic
validity. One could thus employ chi-squared tests, which effectively
treat the standard error of the unrestricted model as known for certain.
We have chosen instead to use F-tests, which are asymptotically equiva-
lent and reflect both models' degrees of freedom (though not necessarily
appropriately) in finite samples.
III
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18. We also attempted to use their J-test but, as they predicted, ran into
insurmountable computational problems.
19. The test statistic is the ratio of a regression coefficient to its
standard error. Asymptotically, this statistic follows a standard
normal distribution under the null hypothesis, and only the asymptotic
properties of this test are known exactly. Consistent with the dis-
cussion in footnote 17, above, however, we follow the conservative
procedure of reporting significance levels derived from a two-tailed
t-test, with 69 degrees of freedom.
20. As nonlinear estimation has been employed, the standard errors have
asymptotic significance only. The precision-weighted average would
be the minimum variance unbiased pooled estimator if each specification
provided an independent, unbiased estimate with known sampling variance.
it is clearly inappropriate to treat these estimates as independent, how-
ever, so that the precision-weighted average serves here merely as a
convenient summary statistic that reflects estimation precision in a
natural way.
21. The latter were computed following the (standard) procedure clearly
described by Goldberger (1964, pp. 122-5).
22. All the precision-weighted means in Table 4 are below the corresponding
mean Yj's except for outdoor media,direct mail, and farm publications.
0.
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23. It should be noted that the constraint = for all j that is imposed
in models 1.4 and II.4 causes the relative values of the medium-sDecific
D*'s from those models to depend only on the estimated d's; larger 's
imply smaller D*'s from (3).
24. See, for instance, Scherer (1980, pp. 96-7).
25. Recalling the discussion in Section II, since television s share of
billings tends to increase with agency size, while the ratio of billings
to gross income decline with size, this sort of underestimation is most
likely for television.' Conversations with industry observers lead us to
expect that disaggregation of the television share into network and spot
components would likely reveal significant scale economies associated
with network television advertising, along with a lower than we find
for television as a whole.
26. It is worth noting that Model I.1, which does not employ the S or the Y.
in any fashion, produces an estimated Z* of $.932 million. A comparison
with the estimates in Table 3 suggests that this figure, which supports
our overall conclusions about minimum efficient scale, is too large
because it confounds media mix and scale effects.
27, See footnote 6.
28. As the discussion in footnote 5 indicates, there is some likelihood that our
estimates overstate the general importance of scale economies in this industry.
29. Counts were made.from the lists of agency accounts reported in the Standard
ffDirectorysf a£-~dv-er-tisi-ng-A-g-ee-nc:-i--e-s (197J8L) 
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Table 1
SUMMARY SAMPLE STATISTICS FOR SHARE OF BILLINGS BY MEDIA CATEGORY
(n = 91)
*Slope coefficients, with t-statistics in parentheses, for simple regressions
of media shares on the natural logarithm of gross income (Y)o Superscripts
denote coefficients significantly different from zero at 10% (a) and 1% (b)
levels (two-tailed t-tests).
t Computed for media category, j as SijYi/ I Y i where the summation is
i
over the 91 agencies in our sample. Does not add to 100 percent due to
rounding.
Estimated Share
Mean (%) of Total Number of aximum ~
Medium Share Sample's Gross Regression Zero Share
(%) Income t Results* Shares (%)
Television 25.57 48.65 .0 7b 13 79.0
(5.91)
General Magazines 17.10 17.61 -o 0003 9 100.0
(0.03)
Newspapers 14.74 9.52 -.025 4 86.0
(2.87)
Radio 12.60 9.50 -oa013 a 10 55.0
(1.80)
Other 10.83 7.62 -.011 35 83.0
(0.96)
Business Publications 9.55 3.55 -.008 32 75 0
(0.87)
Outdoor 2.84 1.95 .001 36 45.0
(0r38)
Point of Purchase 1.30 0.67 -.002 65 18.0
(1.19)
Direct Mail 3.12 0.54 -.010 77 60.0
(1.56)
Farm Publications 2.33 0. 39 -. 008 74 60.0
99_97 (1.58)
99.97
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Table 2
ESTIMATES OF ASYMPTOTIC UNIT COSTS (as) *
Specification Precision-
Medium I. 3 I 4 II3 II 4 Weighted
Meant
Television 17.89 19 57 17.58. 16.74 17 o 89
(3.00) (3.19) (2,96) (2.99)
General Magazines 9.85 8.90 14.98 15.22 13.21
(5.28) (7.67) (4.36) (4.46)
Newspapers 41. 08 40.02 35.53 48.73 43.68
(9.90) (14.18) (9.64) (6.18)
Radio 44.96 40.29 39. 33 33.35 38.52
(8.62) (7.46) (7.92) (7.54)
Other 28.01 26.57 30.50 -186.78 28.58
(4.66) (7.32) (4.73) (98.93)
Business Publications 15.30 16.55 16.92 12.43 15.19
(6.19) (6.22) (6.01) (5.68)
Outdoor 51.08 53.23 56.40 43.74 51.27
(14.67) (14.98) (14.47) (15.28)
Point of Purchase 67.54 56.69 53.79 -236.17 50.55
(36.06) (37.58) (29.22) (116.29)
Direct Mail 4159 31.27 39.81 -209.17 35.76
(11.47) (8.23) (9.28) (99.11)
Farm Publications 52.22 39.93 66.21 -200.74 48.22
(15.03) (9.92) (14,06) (100.79)
* In employees per million dollars of gross income.
are asymptotic standard errors.
t Weighted average across all specifications, using
standard errors as weights.
Figures in parentheses
reciprocals of squared
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Table 3
MINIMUM EFFICIENT AGENCY SIZES (Z*): MODEL I*
* Estimated agency gross income, in millions of dollars, at which medium
specific unit cost is 1% over its limiting value, computed using eq. (2)
with = 0.01. Figures in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
t Computed as in Table 2
* Precision-weighted means multiplied by mean media share from Table 1.
§ Estimated negative, implying decreasing returns to scale everywhere.
Specification Precision-Weighted Corresponding
Medium I.3 I. 4 Meant Medium Income*
Television 0.700 0.044 0. 045 0. 012
(0. 331) (0. 09)
General Magazines 0. 629 0.802 0.660 0.113
(0.206) (0.444)
Newspapers 0. 550 0.592 0.558 0.082
(0.234) (0.467)
Radio 0§ 02. 0.032 032 0o 04
(0.005)
Other 0. 622' lo 646 0 649 0.070
(0.235) (1.448)
Business Publications 0.708 0.518 0.583 0.006
;0,347) (0,250)
Outdoor 0.685 4.070 0.923 0.026
(0.295) (1.074)
Point of Purchase 0.537 0.405 0.523 0.007
(0.512) (1.514)
Direct Mail 0§ 0.051 0.051 0.002
(0.005)
Farm Publications 0§ 0.064 0. 064 0.001
(0.010)
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Table 4
MINIMUM EFFICIENT EDIUM INCOMES (Z*): MODEL II*
* Estimated medium-specific income,
specific unit cost is 1% over its
- n v . _ -
in millions of dollars, at which medium-
limiting value, computed using eq. (2) with
u.u. rFigures n parentheses are asymptotic standard errorso
t Computed as in Table 2.
* Precision-weighted average divided by mean media share from Table 1.
§ Estimated negative, implying decreasing returns to scale everywhere.
# Estimated a negative, Z* undefined.
Specification Precision-Weighted Corresponding
Medium II.3 II.4 Meant Agency Size *
Television O .038 0.043 0.039 0o 152
(0.007) (0.020)
General Magazines 0.038 0.050 05039 0.228
(0.006) (0.035)
Newspapers 0.026 0.029 0.026 O0.176
(0.011) (0.021)
Radio 0§ 0.008 -0.008 0.063
(0o015)
Other 0§ -# 
Business Publications 0§ 0.108 0.108 1.131
(0.051)
Outdoor O. 029 0.145 0.029 1.021
(0.005) (0.125)
Point of Purchase 0.029 -# O. 029 2.231
(0.008
Direct Mail 0.036 -# 0.036 1.154
(0.006)
Farm Publications O. 026 0.# 026 1.116
(0.018)
,~~ , . .., , ., , 
Table 5
COST PENALTY INCURRED AT HALF EFFICIENT SCALE (D*)*
it
* Excess cost, expressed as a percentage,
efficient scale, computed using eq. (3)
incurred at one-half minimum
with £ = 0.01 and k = 0.5.
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
t Computed as in Table 2.
t
* Estimated 3 negative, implying decreasing returns to scale everywhere,
D* undefined.
# Estimated a negative, D* undefined.
Specification Precision-
Medium I.3 Ic4 1.3 II.4 Weighted Meant
Television 27.76 16.78 106.98 36.44 19.16
(15.75) (2.50) (26.70) (8.24)
General Magazines 19.47 25.35 108.03 38.27 34.41
(12.28) (11.69) (24.93) (9.09)
Newspapers 12.99 11.43 21.60 20,95 13.75
(5.48) (2.20) (24.59) (5.12)
Radio 4 11.39 .- 25.53 12.70
(1.91) (5,99)
Other 18.84 14.26 -1 -# 15o 71
(3.61) (2,46)
Business Publications 29.01 18.33 4 4Z,44 21.45
(18.58) (4o21) (11,74)
Outdoor 25.87 9.78 31,72 22.16 12.11
(10.74) (2.10) (11.81) (6.11)
Point of Purchase 12.16 9o 45 34.84 # 9.95
(26.29) (3.43) (25.04)
Direct Mail 4 13.07 76.77 -# 15.28
(2.39) (12.61)
Farm Publications 4 11.45 24.24 -# 11.47
(1.99) (56.75)
 I I
- - - - -- I ---- -- --
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TABLE 6
RESULTS FOR REGRESSIONS OF SHARE OF AGENCY BILLINGS IN EACH MEDIA CATEGORY ON THE
LOGARITHM OF MEAN SIZE OF AGENCY ACCONTS*
(n = 87 agencies)
Sj = a. + j ln(Income/Acct.) + .
3 3 .3
* Mean size of an agency's accounts measured in units of millions of dollars of
Gross Income per account. Based on data for 87 agencies.
**t-statistic in parentheses. Superscripts denote coefficients significantly
di f r n fro zer at 10 (a) 5% (. n % ) l ve s ( - a l d t s )
Dependent Variable: Regression Results
Share of Agency Billings Constant Coefficient for Log 2 Std. Error
in Media Category j(SjTerm Mean Account Size** R of Est.
Television Share 0. 643 e i22 .324 .201
(6.38)
General Magazines Share O. 188 .006 .002 .172
(0.39)
Newspaper Share -0.003 -.04.7c .154 .125
(3.94)
Radio Share 0.066 -.020a .036 .116
(1.79)
Outdoor Share , 0.026 -.001 .0006 .059
(0.22)
Business Publications Share 0.011 -.027b .048 .136
(2.08)
Point of Purchase Share 0.0003 -.004 .024 o030
(1.43)
Farm Publications Share 0.003 -.0.06 .007 .085
(0.76)
Direct Mail Share 0.023 -.001 .0001 .084
(0.11)
Other Share 0.042 -.023 .014 .215
..................... (1.11) {
i~ .. , , i i . . . , ,, ! ... ..... I 
different froma zeroat 10% (a), 5% (b), and 1 (c) levels (2-tailed test).
